

# Particle Physics Division

# Mechanical Department Engineering Note

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COUPP-182

Project: COUPP

Title: ODH & CF3I Safety Analysis for E-961, COUPP - 60 kg

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Key Words: ODH, CF3I, safety, COUPP

### Abstract/Summary:

This is a formal safety analysis evaluating the ODH risk and CF3I exposure risk posed by operation of the COUPP 60 kg bubble chamber.

#### Applicable Codes:

Fermilab Environmental, Safety, and Health Manual chapter 5064, Oxygen Deficiency Hazards

American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) 2005 Threshold Limit Values (TLVs) for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents & Biological Exposure Indices (BEIs) – Minimal Oxygen Content

National Research Council, Committee on Toxicology, Subcommittee on Iodotrifluoromethane, "Iodotrifluoromethane: Toxicity Review". (National Academies Press, 2004)

# **CF<sub>3</sub>I Release Safety Analysis**

# **Outline**

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
### Summary

The analysis definitively shows no risk of ODH from the presence of CF<sub>3</sub>I. The empty water tank (confined space) and the MINOS hall are both shown to be ODH class 0. The exposure risk of CF<sub>3</sub>I during normal operations is minimal and requires no special precautions. The bubble chamber will need to be filled at the beginning of operations and emptied before disassembly. The batch fill or emptying operation poses increased risk for CF<sub>3</sub>I exposure. This risk is exclusively from a potential valve error by an operator. The risk is mitigated to a safe level by requiring a written procedure and an independent person verifying valve operation during the procedure. It can also be effectively argued that the operator would limit the CF<sub>3</sub>I release to negligible amounts by quickly reclosing the valve.

# **General Discussion**

The COUPP 60 kg bubble chamber will contain up to 80 kg of CF<sub>3</sub>I (Trifluormethyl Iodide). CF<sub>3</sub>I is a fire extinguishing agent. It is being used for the COUPP experiment because of its nuclear characteristics. It has the right mass for exploring weakly interacting massive particles (WIMPS). One possible safety concern would be an Oxygen Deficiency Hazard caused by a release of CF<sub>3</sub>I. Another possible safety concern is that CF<sub>3</sub>I is an irritant at levels greater than 0.2% CF<sub>3</sub>I in air. i

The sealed volume of the bubble chamber contains about 40 liters of liquid  $CF_3I$  and 40 liters of liquid water. The liquid density of the  $CF_3I$  is twice that of water so the  $CF_3I$  resides in the quartz jar portion of the chamber with water floating on top.



**Picture 1.** Liquid CF<sub>3</sub>I resides in the lower half of the bubble chamber, H<sub>2</sub>O in the upper.

The CF<sub>3</sub>I is maintained as a liquid because pressure is applied on the dome of the expansion bellows. Propylene glycol surrounds the bubble chamber and is considered the "hydraulic" fluid of the system. See the table below for the anticipated operating conditions.

**Table 1.** Operating states for the COUPP bubble chamber.

							CF3I	
			CF3I	CF3I		CF3I	Fixed	Bellows
		Temp	Pressure	Density		Volume	Mass	Position
State		(Celcius)	(Mpa)	(kg/m^3)	Comments	(Liters)	(kg)	(inches)
1	Fill	1	0.4	2204.7	During fill, condensing	36.00	79.372	-1.86
2	Room temp.	20	0.425	2103.3	Sat. Liquid at 20 C	37.74	79.372	-1.02
3	Operating Temp stable	40	0.72985	1992.3	saturated liquid	39.84	79.372	0.01
4	Operating - cocked	40	0.1	1984.3	unstable Liquid ready to boil	40.00	79.372	0.09
5	Operating - midpoint	40	0.8	1993.2	*Bellows at free length	39.82	79.372	0.00
6	Operating - recompression	40	1.5	2002.1	Recompression Pressure	39.64	79.372	-0.09
7	Aux. operating - stable	50	0.9324	1931.4	saturated liquid	41.10	79.372	0.62
8	Aux. operating - cocked	50	0.1	1918.5	unstable Liquid ready to boil	41.37	79.372	0.76
9	Aux. operating - recompression	50	1.5	1940.3	Recompression Pressure	40.91	79.372	0.53
10	Relieving point of outer vessel	40	2.172	2010.6	Compressed liquid	39.48	79.372	-0.17

The vapor density of  $CF_3I$  is 8.37 kg/m<sup>3</sup> at 20 C and atmospheric pressure. If the 80 kg of  $CF_3I$  is allowed to boil and be released, the volume of gas that will be created is 9.5 m<sup>3</sup>.

# Safety Analysis - Worst Case analysis

### Immediate release of entire contents:

Under normal circumstances, the bubble chamber will be operated in a hot water bath with enclosed light tight tank lid. A release under the water would mean that the  $CF_3I$  vapor would inert the tank lid space (about  $2.4 \, \mathrm{m}^3$ ) and then spill out the perimeter of the tank. The perimeter of the tank is only roughly sealed for light leak purposes. The tank lid is not gas tight. The specific gravity of  $CF_3I$  vapor relative to air is 6.9. There is evidence from experiments done with helium (Specific Gravity =  $0.138 = (7.2)^{-1}$ ) in the Tevatron tunnel that even with density differences by a factor of 7, it is more likely that mixing rather than stratification accurately describes what occurs. We will assume mixing occurs.

The COUPP experiment is currently located in the MINOS hall access tunnel, 350 feet below ground. See picture 2 to see the experiment when it was previously operated in the DZero assembly building during the summer and fall of 2009. The COUPP experiment is sited along the alignment line at station (STA) coordinate "STA 39+50" described on drawing 6-7-6, sheets C-4, A-7, and A-20 of the NUMI Outfitting project 6-7-6. The cross section of the access tunnel can be approximated as 20 feet (6.1 m) wide x 22.5 feet (6.9 m) high. The access tunnel volume starts at approximately STA 37+00 and continues through STA 39+81 (this is 281 feet long) where the tunnel opens up to the MINOS hall.


In order to analyze a reasonably sized volume around the COUPP installation, I will consider the volume to be 20 feet upstream and downstream of COUPP. This is a 40 foot (18.2 m) length of tunnel x 20 ft (6.1 m) wide x 22.5 feet (6.9 m) high. The volume of the access tunnel around COUPP then is  $(6.1 \text{ m x } 6.9 \text{ m x } 18.2 \text{ m}) = 766 \text{ m}^3 = 27,000 \text{ ft}^3$ .

**Worst case ODH Analysis:** During normal operations, if the total  $9.5 \text{ m}^3$  of gas was considered to mix in the volume, then the oxygen concentration would be  $0.21 * (383 \text{ m}^3 - 9.5 \text{ m}^3)$  /(383 m³) = 0.205 = 20.5%. Since the oxygen concentration is nearly normal and greater than 19.5%, the release does not pose an oxygen deficiency hazard. During filling operations, a supply gas cylinder will be present as a source of fluid. The gas cylinder contains only about 80 kg, the same amount as the bubble chamber during normal operation. Therefore the worst case oxygen concentration possible during filling will be 20.5% as well.

Worst case CF3I Analysis: If the total 9.5 m<sup>3</sup> of gas was released and mixed in the MINOS access tunnel around COUPP, then the concentration of  $CF_3I$  would be 9.5 m<sup>3</sup>/766 m<sup>3</sup> = 0.0124 or 1.2%  $CF_3I$ . This is above the  $CF_3I$  concentration threshold that is conservatively acceptable.



**Picture 2.** COUPP equipment located in "the Pit" at DZero Assembly building. The vessel resides in the center of the water tank.



Picture 3. COUPP Outer vessel located inside the 4000 gallon water tank.

If the 9.5 m $^3$  release occurred in an empty water tank, the CF $_3$ I concentration in the water tank volume (4000 gallon = 15 m $^3$ ) could potentially be very high, 63% along with oxygen levels disastrously low, only 7.7%. Therefore a more rigorous analysis (contained later in this note) and some forced air ventilation is required. During access into the empty tank (with or without CF $_3$ I present) confined space procedures are always followed. This includes active oxygen concentration sampling using a calibrated sensing unit, an unexposed observer, a means for rescue without entry into the tank, and an approved confined space permit.

# <u>Safety Analysis methodology – Traditional analysis</u>

The safety analysis methodology that will be followed is Fermilab's safety and health manual chapter on Oxygen Deficiency Hazards, FESHM 5064 revision May 2009. Sections of this chapter are excerpted below.<sup>ii</sup>

The oxygen deficiency hazard fatality rate is defined as:


$$\phi = \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i F_i$$

where  $\emptyset$  = the ODH fatality rate (per hour),

P<sub>i</sub> = the expected rate of the i<sup>th</sup> event (per hour), and

 $F_i$  = the probability of a fatality due to event i.

The summation shall be taken over all events, which may cause oxygen deficiency and result in fatality. The value of  $F_i$  is the probability that a person will die if the i<sup>th</sup> event occurs. The value depends on the oxygen concentration. If the lowest oxygen concentration is greater than 18%, then the value of  $F_i$  is zero, that is, all exposures above 18% are defined to be "safe" and to not contribute to fatality. It is assumed that all exposures to 18% oxygen or lower do contribute to fatality and the value of  $F_i$  is designed to reflect this dependence. If the lowest attainable oxygen concentration is 18%, then the value of  $F_i$  is  $10^{-7}$ . This value would cause f to be  $10^{-7}$  per hour if the expected rate of occurrence of the event were 1 per hour. At decreasing concentrations, the value of  $F_i$  should increase until, at some point, the probability of fatality becomes unity. That point was selected to be 8.8% oxygen, the concentration at which one minute of consciousness is expected.



For the ODH analysis that will be made for entry into an empty water tank with CF3I present, the analysis method will be followed directly. The summation of the hazard fatality rate is made and since the result is less than  $10^{-7}$  hr<sup>-1</sup>, the ODH classification is class 0. The risk is minimized to an acceptable level without special precautions or training.

To evaluate the concern of CF3I exposure, a modification of the terms is made to the analysis.

The CF3I adverse exposure rate is defined as:

$$\mathbf{x} = \sum P_i D_i$$

where X = the adverse exposure rate (per hour),

 $P_{i}$  = the expected rate of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  event (per hour), and

 $D_i$  = the probability of an exposure due to event i.

The summation shall be taken over all events, which may cause a release of  $CF_3I$  and result in an adverse exposure. As was noted in the general discussion,  $CF_3I$  is an irritant at levels on the order of 0.2%. The 0.2%  $CF_3I$  level is considered the no-observed-adverse-effect level (NOAEL) with levels of up to 0.3% acceptable for periods of exposure up to five minutes. I will call a concentration of 0.2%  $CF_3I$  or lower from the i<sup>th</sup> event equal to a value of  $D_i$  of zero. This reasons that an exposure at less than 0.2% is acceptable. An upper threshold of exposure will be set at 0.4%. At this level, critical  $CF_3I$  blood concentration for cardiac sensitization was achieved after 51 seconds. For exposures greater than or equal to 0.4%  $CF_3I$ ,  $D_i$  is equal to unity. I will scale the value of  $D_i$  linearly 0.0 to 1.0 for concentrations between 0.2% and 0.4%.

CF<sub>3</sub>I is used as a fire extinguishing fluid. During such use, the possibility of direct contact with the CF<sub>3</sub>I stream might be possible. The design concentration for use as a fire extinguisher is 5% to 7% concentrations. A reasonable adverse exposure rate would be equivalent to the rate at which a fire extinguisher might be used. The annual probability of fire extinguisher use is 12% according to one source and sounds reasonable. That frequency equates to  $\mathbf{X} = 0.12/(365*24 \, \mathrm{hrs}) = 1.4 \times 10^{-5}$  uses per hour. This will be the level (equivalent to ODH class 0) where the risk of CF<sub>3</sub>I exposure is at an acceptable level without any precautions taken.

**Table 2.** The cases that will be analyzed by traditional analysis are:

ODH	Inside empty water tank	Normal operations, sealed BC
CF3I exposure	Inside empty water tank	Normal operations, sealed BC
CF3I exposure	Access tunnel COUPP area	Normal operations, sealed BC
ODH	Inside empty water tank	Batch Fill or Emptying operation
CF3I exposure	Inside empty water tank	Batch Fill or Emptying operation
CF3I exposure	Access tunnel COUPP area	Batch Fill or Emptying operation

Each analysis will be done using the equations entered into a spreadsheet format. Inputs are ventilation rate, tank or access tunnel volume, an enumeration of components and their failure rates and maximum possible leak rate. Outputs are the oxygen or  $CF_3I$  concentration with time, ODH fatality rate or  $CF_3I$  adverse exposure rate, and classification.

# Components, leak rates and probabilities

The components that are in direct contact to the  $CF_3I$  bubble chamber volume during normal operation are very limited since it is a sealed volume. There is a section of exposed 1" OD x 0.065" wall stainless steel tube that protrudes out of the lid of the outer vessel. There is one main valve, MV-84, and two other valves, MV-83 and MV-80 connected to the purge port of that main valve. There are a total of 5 VCR connections for these valves and to a pressure transmitter, PT-83. Failure rates are determined from tables in FESHM 5064. The failure rate for rupture of the tube section is  $1x10^{-9}$ /hr. Valve leak or rupture rates are  $1x10^{-8}$ /hr. The bellows failure rate is  $3x10^{-6}$ /hr based on it being equivalent to a flex hose. Connections have failure rates of  $3x10^{-6}$ /hr for a complete rupture or  $3x10^{-7}$ /hr for a leak. Welds leaking have a failure rate of  $3x10^{-6}$ /hr. The absolute maximum leak rate possible is bounded by the maximum flow rate that can be achieved up the 1" OD tube during a release. Initially during a release, water would be ejected since it floats on top of the  $CF_3I$ . If the hydraulic system was pressurized, four liters of water would be ejected before the stop plate bottomed out and prevented further collapse of the expansion volume bellows.  $CF_3I$  would boil at a saturation

pressure of 106 psia in the bubble chamber. The maximum flow rate that can be achieved up the tube with 106 psia – 15 psia = 91 psi differential pressure is 684 scfm. This flow rate is limited by the speed of sound in the fluid (106 m/s) and the cross sectional area of the tube. Flow out the main valve is about the same since it is a full ported valve. Flow out the other two valves or any other leaks is limited to a maximum of 29 scfm limited by the cross sectional area of the  $\frac{1}{2}$ " OD x 0.035" wall tubing. An obvious (detectable) leaking connection would be equivalent to a 0.020" diameter hole which would flow at 0.2 scfm.

#### Hydraulic system leak & subsequent CF3I release through ruptured bellows

A loss of pressure in the hydraulic system would cause a pressure differential to develop across the expansion chamber and quartz jar. The large bellows of the expansion chamber is 0.012" thick and is the weakest component in the containment volume. CF<sub>3</sub>I would boil to create 3.3 liters of gas which expands the bellows to the end of its allowed travel (+1.625"). A stop plate that is welded to the top of the 1" tube bottoms out against shoulder bolts limiting further bellows travel. The internal pressure in the bubble chamber would be CF<sub>3</sub>I saturation pressure, 0.73 MPa, at the operating temperature of 40 C. The quartz jar with wall thickness of 4 mm has an allowable internal working pressure rating of at least 1.4 MPa, so it will not break. The bellows design pressure is 0.3 MPa. The bellows manufacturer, Hyspan, states that a permanent set will not occur at pressures 1.5 times the design pressure or in this case 0.5 MPa.

It would be conservative to assume that the bellows leaks at 0.73 MPa. But assuming that it does, the  $CF_3I$  would continue to boil and pass through the bellows leak and then into the propylene glycol space. The  $CF_3I$  as a gas would start displacing the propylene glycol volume from the top down. 9.5 m³ = 9500 liters of  $CF_3I$  gas exceeds the entire volume of the propylene glycol volume = 280 liters (74 gallons) so eventually the  $CF_3I$  gas would leak out the leak in the hydraulic system. But first, some portion of the propylene glycol would need to leak out and that would be obvious to any observer.

The maximum CF<sub>3</sub>I flow rate from a leak through the bellows wall and then through a leak in the hydraulic system can only be based on reasonable speculation. We could speculate for instance that a failure of the bellows into the glycol space would not be catastrophic (large rupture) since the bellows is surrounded by liquid and is made of type 321 stainless steel which is ductile. I can imagine at most a bellows wall crack on the order of 1 mm wide x 5 mm long. A similar sized leak (or larger) in the hydraulic system is required. Based on sonic velocity through that crack, the CF<sub>3</sub>I maximum flow rate is 10 scfm. I will use that in my calculations.

#### Batch fill or batch emptying operations

Special consideration must be given to the occasional situation when we are transferring CF<sub>3</sub>I to or from the bubble chamber via a transfer line connected to a storage container. Extra components are present such as the transfer line and evacuation/purge line. A knowledgeable operator will be required to open and close valves while observing the mass transfer. The water tank will be empty during filling or emptying operations. Emptying or filling are expected to occur at the frequency of once or twice a year. The transfer line size is on the order of ½" OD tube contained within foam insulation or jacketed by a heating/cooling fluid. The transfer line is connected and the line evacuated and then backfilled a number of times. As the last step, the main valve MV-84 is opened to allow gas transfer. When filling, a supply cylinder at a temperature of 40 Celsius and 0.425 MPa pressure is located outside of the water tank. The bubble chamber is cooled to 1 C and condensation occurs. When emptying, the bubble chamber is at a temperature of 40 C and the container to be transferred to is in an ice bath at 1 C. The extra components are added into the spreadsheets to account for the extra items. An extra line, "operator error" is added to account for the possibility that the operator opens a purge valve while the transfer line is open to a CF<sub>3</sub>I source. The rate of human errors such as this is  $3x10^{-3}$  per demand. There are about 3 times that a different valve needs to be operated during the operation. The maximum leak rate is 17 scfm and is based on having a high purity carten MD-250 or equivalent valve with flow coefficient of 0.3.

# **Ventilation**

Active ventilation is provided when accessing the empty water tank. A confined space blower, Allegro Industries part number 9533 is permanently mounted next to the access ladder. It supplies 960 cfm of free air through a 25 foot long, 8" diameter duct. The duct is pulled up and over the tank wall and discharges in the bottom of the tank. The volume of the empty tank is 530 cubic feet so there are roughly two air changes per minute. I only use 500 cfm as the fresh air ventilation rate for the water tank.

The MINOS Hall is ventilated by a 4,000 cfm exhaust fan, EF-4, located on the surface drawing air through a shaft at the downstream end of the MINOS hall. This provides the normal HVAC ventilation in the MINOS hall and is on generator backup.

# **Analysis and Results**

The methodology of the traditional analysis was explained earlier in this note. The calculations are done in a spreadsheet format with equations from FESHM 5064. Case A described in the FESHM chapter was most applicable for the tank space. It is a case that assumed mixing and some ventilation input. Below is the pertinent equation excerpted from the chapter:

<u>Case A</u> During release - Ventilation fan(s) blowing outside air into the confined volume. Differential equation for the oxygen mass balance

(1) 
$$V\frac{dC}{dt} = 0.21Q - (R+Q)C$$

Solution with the boundary condition of C=0.21 at t=0

$$C(t) = \left(\frac{0.21}{Q + R}\right) \left[Q + R e^{-\left(\frac{Q + R}{V}\right)t}\right]$$
(2)

### Definitions

C = oxygen concentration

Cr = oxygen concentration during the release

Ce = oxygen concentration after the release has ended

Q = ventilation rate of fan(s), (cfm or  $m^3/s$ )

R = spill rate into confined volume, (scfm or  $m^3/s$ )

t = time, (minutes or seconds) beginning of release is at t=0

 $t_e$  = time when release has ended, (minutes or seconds)

 $V = confined volume, (ft^3 or m^3)$ 

Some time input is necessary. For analysis inside the empty water tank, I chose to evaluate the concentrations at 0.5 and 1.0 minutes. This is because it takes very little time to exit the tank if something bad occurred. CF3I as an irritant is easily detectable and there is also an active, calibrated air sampling unit monitoring the space as part of confined space entry rules. An unexposed confined space attendant also is present as part of the confined space entry rules.

Case B described in FESHM chapter 5064 was most applicable for analyzing the access tunnel volume around the experiment. It is a case that assumes mixing and an exhaust ventilation rate. The pertinent equation excerpted from the chapter follows:

<u>Case B</u> During release - Ventilation fans(s) drawing contaminated atmosphere from the confined volume with the ventilation rate greater than the spill rate (Q>R).

Differential equation for the oxygen mass balance

$$V\frac{dC}{dt} = 0.21(Q - R) - QC$$

Solution with the boundary condition of C=0.21 at t=0

$$C(t) = 0.21 \left(1 - \frac{R}{Q}\right) \left(1 - e^{-\frac{Q}{V}t}\right)$$

The time input for analysis of the pit volume was chosen to be 5 and 10 minutes. If an event occurred, it may take a little while to discover an issue.

The 0.21 used in the equations is the starting fraction of oxygen. Recognizing this, the same equations can be used to calculate the increasing  $CF_3I$  concentration during a release. The 0.21 is replaced by 1.0 so the equation represents the fraction of air during the release. That fraction is subtracted from 1.0 to give the fraction of the inert gas,  $CF_3I$ . The formulas used in the ODH and  $CF_3I$  analysis spreadsheets are included in their raw format after the analysis spreadsheets.

Table 3. Analysis Results

Type of Analysis	Location	Operational condition	Worst case % O <sub>2</sub> or %CF <sub>3</sub> I	Ø or χ Summation (per hour)	Class *
ODH	MINOS tunnel by COUPP	Normal or Filling operations	Min. $O_2 = 20.5 \%$ (release of all 80 kg)	Not applicable	ODH class 0
ODH	Inside empty water tank	Normal operation	Min. $O_2 = 12.6 \%$ (1" tube severed) $O_2 > 20.5\%$ all other cases	$\emptyset = 1 \times 10^{-12}$	ODH class 0
CF₃I exposure	Inside empty water tank	Normal operation	Max. $CF_3I = 40 \%$ (1" tube severed) $CF_3I < 2.5\%$ all other cases	$\chi = 1.6 \times 10^{-5}$	CF₃I class 1
CF₃I exposure	MINOS tunnel by COUPP	Normal operation	Max. $CF_3I = 13 \%$ (1" tube severed) $CF_3I < 0.6\%$ all other cases	$\chi = 4.6 \times 10^{-6}$	CF <sub>3</sub> I class 0
ODH	Inside empty water tank	Batch Fill or Emptying	Min. $O_2 = 12.6 \%$ (1" tube severed) $O_2 > 20.5\%$ all other cases	$\emptyset = 1.2 \times 10^{-11}$	ODH class 0
CF₃I exposure	Inside empty water tank	Batch Fill or Emptying	Max. CF <sub>3</sub> I = 40 % (1" tube severed) CF <sub>3</sub> I < 2.5% all other cases	$\chi = 9.0 \times 10^{-3}$	CF₃I class 3
CF <sub>3</sub> I exposure	MINOS tunnel by COUPP	Batch Fill or Emptying	Max. $CF_3I = 13 \%$ (1" tube severed) $CF_3I < 0.6\%$ all other cases	$\chi = 5.8 \times 10^{-3}$	CF₃I class 3

<sup>\*</sup> CF<sub>3</sub>I Class 1 can be thought of as the exposure risk of using a CF3I fire extinguisher every 0.8 to 8 years. Class 2 is like the risk involved in using the fire extinguisher at a frequency between 1 to 10 months. Class 3 is like being exposed to the risk of using a CF3I fire extinguisher at a frequency of every 3 to 30 days.

# **Conclusion**

As can be seen in table 3, and earlier arrived at in the worst case bounding analysis, ODH is not a concern. CF<sub>3</sub>I exposure is a minor concern, borderline CF<sub>3</sub>I class 1, for entry into the empty water tank during normal operations. This type of entry might be rather frequent during the initial phase of operations. Propylene glycol high point bleed valves on the outer vessel will need to be manipulated during de-gassing operations. There may also be a need to access the camera enclosure and cameras. Since it is CF<sub>3</sub>I class 1, the precautions that will be taken are: a.) minimum 950 cfm air input into the tank by forced ventilation b.) confined space procedures.

The batch CF<sub>3</sub>I filling or emptying operation has been identified as an operation that has a significant potential for CF<sub>3</sub>I exposure if an operator makes an error in opening a valve that allows direct venting of CF<sub>3</sub>I into the water tank. Study of the spreadsheets shows that operator error is the only significant event that contributes to the CF<sub>3</sub>I class 3 rating. The CF<sub>3</sub>I concentration inside the tank could reach 2% after a minute of unchecked venting. It is very arguable that an operator error of this type would be only momentary as the operator would quickly re-close the valve and the CF<sub>3</sub>I release very short lived. I note that CF<sub>3</sub>I concentrations for use of fire extinguishers are 5-7%. A precaution that will be taken to help mitigate this risk will be requiring a written procedure and independent observation of actions by the confined space attendant. This is in addition to forced ventilation and the confined space procedure. The CF3I analysis for the MINOS access tunnel around COUPP also resulted in a CF3I class 3 rating due to the possibility of operator error. If the operator left a valve open, the CF3I concentration in the tunnel would reach 0.3 %. This level is tolerable (not life threatening) for the twenty minutes it would take to deplete the entire inventory of CF3I and end the event. It is very arguable that an operator error of this type would be only momentary as the operator would quickly re-close the valve and the CF<sub>3</sub>I release very short lived.

# **APPENDIX**

The spreadsheet calculative analysis cases that follow are:

ODH	Inside empty water tank	Normal operations, sealed BC
CF3I exposure	Inside empty water tank	Normal operations, sealed BC
CF3I exposure	Access tunnel COUPP area	Normal operations, sealed BC
ODH	Inside empty water tank	Batch Fill or Emptying operation
CF3I exposure	Inside empty water tank	Batch Fill or Emptying operation
CF3I exposure	Access tunnel COUPP area	Batch Fill or Emptying operation

### **ODH** analysis Inside Empty Water Tank

Air Input Q	TC, min.	V/Q		Normal oper	ations, b	ubble chambe	er isolated						
950 cfm	0.56			_	_								
Volume V	Elevation		Pressure										
530 ft^3	700 ft		742 mmHG										
		N	P	GROUP	R	Q/R	Time	fO2{t1}	Time	fO2{t2}	F (t2)	Ø	ODH
ITEM	TYPE		FAIL RATE	FAIL RATE	leak rate	LEAK/VENT	(t1) min.	FRACT 02	(t2) min.	FRACT 02	Fatal. Factor	Fatal. Rate	Class
BC 1" tube	Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-09	1.00E-09	684	0.7200	0.50	14.09%	1.00	12.61%	1.12E-04	1.12E-13	0
BC 1" Valve	Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	684	0.7200	0.50	14.09%	1.00	12.61%	1.12E-04	1.12E-12	0
BC Valves	Bubble Ch.	2	1.00E-08	2.00E-08	29	0.0305	0.50	20.62%	1.00	20.48%	1.59E-09	3.17E-17	0
BC Bellows	Bubble Ch.	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	0.0305	0.50	20.62%	1.00	20.48%	1.59E-09	4.76E-15	0
Conn. rupture	Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-07	1.50E-06	29	0.0305	0.50	20.62%	1.00	20.48%	1.59E-09	2.38E-15	0
Conn. leak	Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-06	1.50E-05	0.2	0.0002	0.50	21.00%	1.00	21.00%	8.40E-10	1.26E-14	0
Instruments	Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	29	0.0305	0.50	20.62%	1.00	20.48%	1.59E-09	1.59E-17	0
Welds	Bubble Ch.	6	3.00E-09	1.80E-08	29	0.0305	0.50	20.62%	1.00	20.48%	1.59E-09	2.86E-17	0
Pipes	hydraulic	5	1.00E-09	5.00E-09	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	5.22E-18	0
Elbows	hydraulic	10	3.00E-07	3.00E-06	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	3.13E-15	0
Tees	hydraulic	4	3.00E-07	1.20E-06	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	1.25E-15	0
Valves	hydraulic	10	1.00E-08	1.00E-07	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	1.04E-16	0
Connections	hydraulic	20	3.00E-06	6.00E-05	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	6.27E-14	0
Hoses	hydraulic	4	3.00E-06	1.20E-05	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	1.25E-14	0
Instruments	hydraulic	0	1.00E-08	0.00E+00	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	0.00E+00	0
	TOTAL					•				•	•	1.33E-12	0

					CF3I a	nalysis I	nside Emp	ty Water	Tank					
					Normal ope	erations, bu	ıbble chamber i	solated						
Air Input	Q	TC, min.	V/Q											
950	cfm	0.56				_								
Volume	٧	Elevation		Pressure										
530	ft^3	700 ft		742 mmHG										
			N	P	GROUP	R	Q/R	Time	fCF3I{t1}	Time	fCF3I{t2}	D(t2)	Х	CF3I
ITEM		TYPE		FAIL RATE	FAIL RATE	leak rate	LEAK/VENT	(t1) min.	FRACT CF3I	(t2) min.	FRACT CF3I	Exposure Factor	Exp. Rate	Class
BC 1" tube		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-09	1.00E-09	684	0.7200	0.50	32.90%	1.00	39.94%	1.00	1.00E-09	0
BC 1" Valve		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	684	0.7200	0.50	32.90%	1.00	39.94%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
BC Valves		Bubble Ch.	2	1.00E-08	2.00E-08	29	0.0305	0.50	1.79%	1.00	2.50%	1.00	2.00E-08	0
BC Bellows		Bubble Ch.	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	0.0305	0.50	1.79%	1.00	2.50%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
Conn. Ruptu	ire	Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-07	1.50E-06	29	0.0305	0.50	1.79%	1.00	2.50%	1.00	1.50E-06	0
Conn. Leak		Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-06	1.50E-05	0.2	0.0002	0.50	0.01%	1.00	0.02%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Instruments		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	29	0.0305	0.50	1.79%	1.00	2.50%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
Welds		Bubble Ch.	6	3.00E-09	1.80E-08	29	0.0305	0.50	1.79%	1.00	2.50%	1.00	1.80E-08	0
Pipes		hydraulic	5	1.00E-09	5.00E-09	10	0.0105	0.50	0.62%	1.00	0.87%	1.00	5.00E-09	0
Elbows		hydraulic	10	3.00E-07	3.00E-06	10	0.0105	0.50	0.62%	1.00	0.87%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
Tees		hydraulic	4	3.00E-07	1.20E-06	10	0.0105	0.50	0.62%	1.00	0.87%	1.00	1.20E-06	0
Valves		hydraulic	10	1.00E-08	1.00E-07	10	0.0105	0.50	0.62%	1.00	0.87%	1.00	1.00E-07	0
Conn. Ruptu	ire	hydraulic	20	3.00E-07	6.00E-06	10	0.0105	0.50	0.62%	1.00	0.87%	1.00	6.00E-06	0
Conn. Leak		hydraulic	20	3.00E-06	6.00E-05	0.2	0.0002	0.50	0.01%	1.00	0.02%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Hoses Ruptu	ıre	hydraulic	4	3.00E-07	1.20E-06	10	0.0105	0.50	0.62%	1.00	0.87%	1.00	1.20E-06	0
Hoses Leak		hydraulic	4	3.00E-06	1.20E-05	0.2	0.0002	0.50	0.01%	1.00	0.02%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Instruments		hydraulic	0	1.00E-08	0.00E+00	0	0.0000	0.50	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
		TOTAL											1.61E-05	1


					CF3I an	alysis i	n Access	tunnel 1	•					
Air Exhaust	Q	TC, min.	V/Q		Normal ope	rations, bu	ıbble chambe	r isolated						
4,000	cfm	6.75				_								
Volume	٧	Elevation		Pressure										
27,000	ft^3	700 ft		742 mmHG										
			N	Р	GROUP	R	Q/R	Time	fCF3I{t1}	Time	fCF3I{t2}	D(t2)	X	CF3I
ITEM		TYPE		FAIL RATE	FAIL RATE	leak rate	LEAK/VENT	(t1) min.	FRACT CF3I	(t2) min.	FRACT CF3I	Exposure Factor	Exp. Rate	Class
BC 1" tube		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-09	1.00E-09	684	0.1710	5.00	8.95%	10.00	13.21%	1.00	1.00E-09	0
BC 1" Valve		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	684	0.1710	5.00	8.95%	10.00	13.21%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
BC Valves		Bubble Ch.	2	1.00E-08	2.00E-08	29	0.0073	5.00	0.38%	10.00	0.56%	1.00	2.00E-08	0
BC Bellows		Bubble Ch.	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	0.0073	5.00	0.38%	10.00	0.56%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
conn. rupture		Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-07	1.50E-06	29	0.0073	5.00	0.38%	10.00	0.56%	1.00	1.50E-06	0
conn. leak		Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-06	1.50E-05	0.2	0.0001	5.00	0.00%	10.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
instruments		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	29	0.0073	5.00	0.38%	10.00	0.56%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
welds		Bubble Ch.	6	3.00E-09	1.80E-08	29	0.0073	5.00	0.38%	10.00	0.56%	1.00	1.80E-08	0
Pipes		hydraulic	10	1.00E-09	1.00E-08	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Elbows		hydraulic	30	3.00E-07	9.00E-06	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Tees		hydraulic	25	3.00E-07	7.50E-06	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Valves		hydraulic	50	1.00E-08	5.00E-07	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
connections		hydraulic	200	3.00E-06	6.00E-04	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
hoses		hydraulic	7	3.00E-06	2.10E-05	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
instruments		hydraulic	11	1.00E-08	1.10E-07	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
		TOTAL											4.56E-06	0

					ODH ar	alysis I	nside Emp	ty Wat	er Tank					
Air Input	Q	TC, min.	V/Q		Batch fill o	r Batch ei	npty operation	on						
950	cfm	0.56												
Volume	٧	Elevation		Pressure										
530	ft^3	700 ft		742 mmHG										
			N	P	GROUP	R	Q/R	Time	fO2{t1}	Time	fO2{t2}	F (t2)	Ø	ODH
ITEM		TYPE		FAIL RATE	FAIL RATE	leak rate	LEAK/VENT	(t1) min.	FRACT 02	(t2) min.	FRACT 02	Fatal. Factor	Fatal. Rate	Class
BC 1" tube		Bubble Ch	1	1.00E-09	1.00E-09	684	0.7200	0.50	14.09%	1.00	12.61%	1.12E-04	1.12E-13	0
BC 1" Valve		Bubble Ch	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	684	0.7200	0.50	14.09%	1.00	12.61%	1.12E-04	1.12E-12	0
BC Valves		Bubble Ch	4	1.00E-08	4.00E-08	29	0.0305	0.50	20.62%	1.00	20.48%	1.59E-09	6.35E-17	0
BC Bellows		Bubble Ch	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	0.0305	0.50	20.62%	1.00	20.48%	1.59E-09	4.76E-15	0
Conn. rupture		Bubble Ch	8	3.00E-07	2.40E-06	29	0.0305	0.50	20.62%	1.00	20.48%	1.59E-09	3.81E-15	0
Conn. leak		Bubble Ch	8	3.00E-06	2.40E-05	0.2	0.0002	0.50	21.00%	1.00	21.00%	8.40E-10	2.02E-14	0
Instruments		Bubble Ch	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	29	0.0305	0.50	20.62%	1.00	20.48%	1.59E-09	1.59E-17	0
Welds		Bubble Ch	10	3.00E-09	3.00E-08	29	0.0305	0.50	20.62%	1.00	20.48%	1.59E-09	4.76E-17	0
transfer line		CF3I	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	0.0305	0.50	20.62%	1.00	20.48%	1.59E-09	4.76E-15	0
operator error		open valve	3	3.00E-03	9.00E-03	17	0.0179	0.50	20.78%	1.00	20.69%	1.22E-09	1.10E-11	0
Pipes		hydraulic	5	1.00E-09	5.00E-09	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	5.22E-18	0
Elbows		hydraulic	10	3.00E-07	3.00E-06	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	3.13E-15	0
Tees		hydraulic	4	3.00E-07	1.20E-06	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	1.25E-15	0
Valves		hydraulic	10	1.00E-08	1.00E-07	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	1.04E-16	0
Connections		hydraulic	20	3.00E-06	6.00E-05	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	6.27E-14	0
Hoses		hydraulic	4	3.00E-06	1.20E-05	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	1.25E-14	0
Instruments		hydraulic	0	1.00E-08	0.00E+00	10	0.0105	0.50	20.87%	1.00	20.82%	1.04E-09	0.00E+00	0
		TOTAL											1.23E-11	0


					CF3I an	alysis I	nside Em	pty Wat	ter Tank					
					Batch fill o	r Batch e	mpty operat	ion						
Air Input	Q	TC, min.	V/Q											
950	cfm	0.56				_								
Volume	٧	Elevation		Pressure										
530	ft^3	700 ft		742 mmHG										
			N	P	GROUP	R	Q/R	Time	fCF3I{t1}	Time	fCF3I{t2}	D(t2)	Х	CF3I
ITEM		TYPE		FAIL RATE	FAIL RATE	leak rate	LEAK/VENT	(t1) min.	FRACT CF3I	(t2) min.	FRACT CF3I	Exposure Factor	Exp. Rate	Class
BC 1" tube		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-09	1.00E-09	684	0.7200	0.50	32.90%	1.00	39.94%	1.00	1.00E-09	0
BC 1" Valve		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	684	0.7200	0.50	32.90%	1.00	39.94%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
BC Valves		Bubble Ch.	2	1.00E-08	2.00E-08	29	0.0305	0.50	1.79%	1.00	2.50%	1.00	2.00E-08	0
BC Bellows		Bubble Ch.	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	0.0305	0.50	1.79%	1.00	2.50%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
Conn. Rupture		Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-07	1.50E-06	29	0.0305	0.50	1.79%	1.00	2.50%	1.00	1.50E-06	0
Conn. Leak		Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-06	1.50E-05	0.2	0.0002	0.50	0.01%	1.00	0.02%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
instruments		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	29	0.0305	0.50	1.79%	1.00	2.50%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
welds		Bubble Ch.	6	3.00E-09	1.80E-08	29	0.0305	0.50	1.79%	1.00	2.50%	1.00	1.80E-08	0
transfer line		CF3I	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	0.0305	0.50	1.79%	1.00	2.50%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
operator error		open valve	3	3.00E-03	9.00E-03	17	0.0179	0.50	1.05%	1.00	1.47%	1.00	9.00E-03	3
Pipes		hydraulic	5	1.00E-09	5.00E-09	10	0.0105	0.50	0.62%	1.00	0.87%	1.00	5.00E-09	0
Elbows		hydraulic	10	0.00-0.	3.00E-06	10	0.0105	0.50	0.62%	1.00	0.87%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
Tees		hydraulic	4	3.00E-07	1.20E-06	10	0.0105	0.50	0.62%	1.00	0.87%	1.00	1.20E-06	0
Valves		hydraulic	10	1.00E-08	1.00E-07	10	0.0105	0.50	0.62%	1.00	0.87%	1.00	1.00E-07	0
Conn. Rupture		hydraulic	20		6.00E-06	10	0.0105	0.50	0.62%	1.00	0.87%	1.00	6.00E-06	0
Conn. Leak		hydraulic	20		6.00E-05	0.2	0.0002	0.50	0.01%	1.00	0.02%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Hoses Rupture		hydraulic	4	3.00E-07	1.20E-06	10	0.0105	0.50	0.62%	1.00	0.87%	1.00	1.20E-06	0
Hoses Leak		hydraulic	4	3.00E-06	1.20E-05	0.2	0.0002	0.50	0.01%	1.00	0.02%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
instruments		hydraulic	0	1.00E-08	0.00E+00	0	0.0000	0.50	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
		TOTAL											9.02E-03	3

					CF3I ans	CF3I analysis in Access tunnel by COUPP								
					Cr 31 and	41y515 11	Access	umici D	y COULT					
					Batch fill or	Batch e	mpty operati	on						
Air Input	Q	TC, min.	V/Q											
4,000	cfm	6.75												
Volume	٧	Elevation		Pressure										
27,000	ft^3	700 ft		742 mmHG										
			N	P	GROUP	R	Q/R	Time	fCF3I{t1}	Time	fCF3I{t2}	D(t2)	Х	CF3I
ITEM		TYPE		FAIL RATE	FAIL RATE	leak rate	LEAK/VENT	(t1) min.	FRACT CF3I	(t2) min.	FRACT CF3I	Exposure Factor	Exp. Rate	Class
BC 1" tube	е	Bubble Ch	1	1.00E-09	1.00E-09	684	0.1710	5.00	8.95%	10.00	13.21%	1.00	1.00E-09	0
BC 1" Valv	ve	Bubble Ch	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	684	0.1710	5.00	8.95%	10.00	13.21%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
BC Valves	;	Bubble Ch	2	1.00E-08	2.00E-08	29	0.0073	5.00	0.38%	10.00	0.56%	1.00	2.00E-08	0
BC Bellow	/S	Bubble Ch	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	0.0073	5.00	0.38%	10.00	0.56%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
Conn. Rup	oture	Bubble Ch	5	3.00E-07	1.50E-06	29	0.0073	5.00	0.38%	10.00	0.56%	1.00	1.50E-06	0
Conn. Lea	ık	Bubble Ch	5	3.00E-06	1.50E-05	0.2	0.0001	5.00	0.00%	10.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Instrument	ts	Bubble Ch	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	29	0.0073	5.00	0.38%	10.00	0.56%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
Welds		Bubble Ch	6	3.00E-09	1.80E-08	29	0.0073	5.00	0.38%	10.00	0.56%	1.00	1.80E-08	0
transfer li	ine	CF <sub>3</sub> I	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	0.0073	5.00	0.38%	10.00	0.56%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
operator	error	open valve	3	3.00E-03	9.00E-03	17	0.0043	5.00	0.22%	10.00	0.33%	0.64	5.78E-03	3
Pipes		hydraulic	10	1.00E-09	1.00E-08	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Elbows		hydraulic	30	3.00E-07	9.00E-06	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Tees		hydraulic	25	3.00E-07	7.50E-06	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Valves		hydraulic	50	1.00E-08	5.00E-07	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Conn. Rup	oture	hydraulic	200	3.00E-07	6.00E-05	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Conn. Lea	ık	hydraulic	200	3.00E-06	6.00E-04	0.2	0.0001	5.00	0.00%	10.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Hoses Ru	pture	hydraulic	7	3.00E-07	2.10E-06	10	0.0025	5.00	0.13%	10.00	0.19%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Hoses Lea	ak	hydraulic	7	3.00E-06	2.10E-05	0.2	0.0001	5.00	0.00%	10.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Instrument	ts	hydraulic	11	1.00E-08	1.10E-07	0	0.0000	5.00	0.00%	10.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
		TOTAL			_								5.79E-03	3

#### The raw equations for the ODH analysis are shown in the following two tables.




#### The raw equations for the CF3I analysis are shown in the following two tables.



=SUM(N10:N26

=IF(N27<=0.0000001,0,IF(N27<=0.00001,1,IF(N27<=0.001,2,IF(N27<=0.1,3,4))))



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Skaggs, S. R., and Rubenstein, R., "Setting the Occupational Exposure Limits for CF3I," Proceedings, Halon Options Technical Working Conference, Albuquerque, NM, pp. 254-261, 1991.

Fermi National Accelerator Lab ES&H Manual chapter 5064, May 2009 revision, http://www-esh.fnal.gov/FESHM/5000/5064.htm.

iii National Research Council, Committee on Toxicology, Subcommittee on Iodotrifluoromethane,

<sup>&</sup>quot;lodotrifluoromethane: Toxicity Review". (National Academies Press, 2004), p. 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>iv</sup> National Research Council, Committee on Toxicology, Subcommittee on Iodotrifluoromethane,

<sup>&</sup>quot;lodotrifluoromethane: Toxicity Review". (National Academies Press, 2004), p. 8.